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Lattanza: The "Foul" Protection

THE “FOUL” PROTECTION FOR A PHOTOGRAPHER’S
ORIGINAL AND CREATIVE CHOICES IN A PHOTOGRAPH:
EXPLORING THE IMPLICATIONS OF RENTMEESTER V. NIKE,
INC. ON CREATIVITY IN PHOTOGRAPHY
Olivia Lattanza*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The idea that “[p]hotographs are imbued with no less creativity,
depth, and meaning than any other art form, and as such should be
entitled to the full protection of copyright law” is an essential concept
to consider when examining the scope of copyright protection for a
photograph. 1 In Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 2 the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s dismissal of a copyright infringement claim filed by
Jacobus Rentmeester (“Rentmeester”) against Nike, Inc. (“Nike”),
holding that Nike’s photograph was not substantially similar to
Rentmeester’s photograph as a matter of law. 3 The Ninth Circuit’s
misguided application of copyright law in finding that the works were
not substantially similar has serious implications for photographers’
development of creative works in the future.
In 1984, Rentmeester photographed Michael Jordan (“Jordan”)
for an issue of Life Magazine that highlighted athletes who would be

* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2020; Boston College, B.A.
in Psychology, minor in Music, 2017. This Note was developed from a paper written for my
Copyright Law class taught by Professor Rena Seplowitz. I would like to thank Professor
Seplowitz for igniting my interest in this area of law and for always providing invaluable
guidance throughout all stages of the writing process. I would also like to thank my family
for their love and support in all aspects of my life.
1
Brief for The American Society of Media Photographers, Inc. and The National Press
Photographers Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13, Rentmeester v.
Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 18-728) [hereinafter “Brief for Am. Soc’y of
Media Photographers”].
2 883 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 1375 (2019).
3 Id. at 1116, 1125.
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competing in the Summer Olympic Games. 4 The photograph featuring
Jordan in “an artificial dunk pose inspired by ballet” is revered “by
TIME Magazine as one of the most influential images of all time.” 5 In
addition to the unique ballet pose, Rentmeester largely orchestrated
many of the elements of the photograph, including the camera position,
strobe lights, and shutter speed. 6 Subsequently, Rentmeester and Nike
executed a licensing agreement that allowed Nike to use the color
transparencies of his photograph. 7 However, Nike violated this
agreement when it hired its own photographer to shoot a photograph
of Jordan that was “obviously inspired by Rentmeester’s” photograph. 8
Nike’s photograph captured many visually similar elements to the
Rentmeester photograph, notably the leaping position towards the
basketball hoop and the camera angle. 9 Then, Rentmeester allowed
Nike to use its photograph on billboards and posters for two more years
for $15,000. 10 In 2015, Rentmeester filed suit for copyright
infringement because Nike continued to reproduce the photograph
after the original two-year term expired. 11
The Ninth Circuit held that even though the two photographs
are similar, the photographs are not substantially similar because
Nike’s photograph displays distinct and creative photographic
choices. 12 Additionally, the court reasoned that there was no copyright
infringement because Rentmeester cannot prevent other photographers
from capturing the idea “of Jordan in a leaping, grand-jeté-inspired
pose.” 13 However, by holding that the photographs were not
substantially similar, the Ninth Circuit split from various circuits in
determining the scope of protection for a photograph. 14 Compared to
Id. at 1115. This paragraph will only present a brief discussion of the facts. For a detailed
discussion of the background of this case, see Part IV.
5 Steve Brachmann, Supreme Court Asked to Decide Copyrightable Elements of Iconic
7,
2019),
Michael
Jordan
Photograph, IPWATCHDOG (Jan.
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/01/07/supreme-court-rentmeester-michael-jordanphotograph/id=104650/.
6 Id.; Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1115.
7 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1116.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.; see Appendix for a comparison of the two photographs.
12 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1121.
13 Id.
14 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir.
2018) (No. 18-728).
4
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the Ninth Circuit, the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits award
copyright protection for a photographer’s “artistic judgment” in
contributing “original elements” to a photograph. 15 If the photographs
were analyzed in one of these circuits by considering Rentmeester’s
creative choices in the “selection and arrangement” of photographic
elements, the court would most likely have found that the photographs
are substantially similar. 16 Unlike the Ninth Circuit, these circuits
would also have found that the ballet-inspired pose is both original and
protectable under copyright law.
Although inconsistency among the circuits is not necessarily a
negative feature in the law, this Note will argue that the Ninth Circuit
misapplied the test for substantial similarity when examining the
photographs, especially when it dismissed Rentmeester’s original and
artistic judgments as unprotectable elements. This decision should be
viewed cautiously because the Ninth Circuit dismissed “various clearly
creative and unique elements” that appeared in both photographs
“based on minor differences.” 17 As a result, this decision has the
potential to “stifle creativity” because it will limit copyright protection
Id. at 26.
Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 15; Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 14, at 26-27. If the works were found to be substantially similar, Nike
would not have a strong fair use defense. The fair use doctrine is intended to promote the
growth of copyright by allowing the limited use of the expression of another work in an
author’s later work. In determining whether there is copyright infringement, the courts will
consider four factors for the fair use defense. Specifically, the courts will evaluate “the
purpose and character of the use,” “the nature of the copyrighted work,” “the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” and “the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (2019). Here, Nike’s fair use defense would fail because of “the amount and
substantiality” factor. Nike took the heart of Rentmeester’s work by posing Jordan in a similar
ballet-inspired leap towards the basketball hoop. Also, it copied several photographic
elements in the Rentmeester photograph, including the pose, outdoors setting, and angle. If
Nike asserted a fair use defense, it would most likely fail based on this factor alone.
Additionally, the first fair use factor does not weigh in favor of Nike because its photograph
was not transformative. To determine whether a new work is transformative, one must
evaluate “whether the new work merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation, or
instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning, or message.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 579 (1994) (internal citations omitted). According to the Supreme Court, “the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.” Id. Nike’s photograph was not
transformative because it did not provide any new meaning, purpose, or expression to
Rentmeester’s photograph. Instead, Nike’s photograph simply took various elements of
Rentmeester’s photograph without adding any new value to the original photograph. For an
example of a photographic advertisement that was transformative, see infra note 150.
17 Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 15.
15
16
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for a photographer who created an original work and produce
confusion regarding the protections granted to photographers under
copyright law. 18 Consequently, although Rentmeester’s petition for
certiorari was denied, the petition reflected the need for the Supreme
Court to “set the law aright” to prevent a negative impact on
creativity. 19
This Note will argue that the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of the
district court’s decision inappropriately analyzed the substantial
similarity between the photographs because the court failed to consider
the creative choices in Rentmeester’s overall “selection and
arrangement” of photographic elements. 20 Therefore, by essentially
holding that copyright law offers limited protection for a
photographer’s original and creative judgments in the selection and
arrangement of a photograph, the Ninth Circuit’s test for substantial
similarity may negatively impact the future of creativity in
photography by limiting the scope of protection for photographs.
Part II of this Note will explore the essential elements of a
copyrightable work, which will help to lay a foundation in later
sections for examining the scope of copyright protection in a
photograph. Specifically, this section will discuss fixation, originality,
and creativity, along with their relationship to photographic works.
Then, this section will examine the requirements for copyright
infringement, the inverse-ratio rule, and the extrinsic and intrinsic tests
for substantial similarity. Part III will analyze the leading photography
copyright infringement cases, focusing on a discussion of a
photographer’s creative choices in the selection and arrangement of a
photograph. This section will also examine the photography cases
decided in the circuits that disagree with the Ninth Circuit. Part IV
will discuss the background and procedural posture of Rentmeester, as
well as the Ninth Circuit’s comparison of the two photographs and the
dissenting opinion. Part V will analyze the Ninth Circuit’s split from
various circuits and the implications of this case on the future of
creativity in photography. This section will also propose a better
approach for the Ninth Circuit’s review of future photography cases.
Lastly, Part VI will conclude by summarizing the main points of
Rentmeester and the impact of this decision on the creativity of
photographers.
18
19
20

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 24.
Id. at 3.
Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 15.
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COPYRIGHT LAW AND PHOTOGRAPHIC WORKS

Under the “Intellectual Property Clause” of the United States
Constitution, the Framers encouraged the creation of works “[t]o
This
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 21
constitutional clause authorizes Congress “to enact both copyright and
patent legislation.” 22 As the production of such works was vital to the
Founding Fathers for the success and development of the Nation, they
expressly included an incentive to create these works in the
Constitution.23 Under the Copyright Act of 1976, several requirements
must be met to ensure the creation of copyrightable works. The
following subsection will examine these requirements and connect
them to photographic works.
A.

Scope of Protection under the Copyright Act of
1976
1.

Fixation

Under the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright protection extends
to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.” 24 Specifically, “[a] work is ‘fixed’ . . . when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration.” 25 Unlike the 1909 Act, the 1976 Act secures
protection for works at the start of fixation, “even if they were
unpublished.” 26 The 1976 Act enumerates eight categories of
copyrightable works that are protected once they are fixed, 27 including
21 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 1.02 (2019).
22 NIMMER, supra note 21 (citation omitted).
23 Gene Quinn, Patents, Copyrights and the Constitution, Perfect Together, IPWATCHDOG
(Feb.
19,
2018),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/02/19/patents-copyrightsconstitution/id=93941/.
24 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2019).
25 Id. § 101. Fixed works “can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated” in
the following ways: “directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” Id. § 102(a).
26 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE:
2018, at 495 (2018). For works analyzed under the 1909 Act, the work secures copyright
protection when it is published. Id. at 521.
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (providing a list of the eight categories of copyrightable works).
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“pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.” 28 Additionally, “[t]he 1976
Act expanded both the scope and duration of protection.” 29 With The
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, the term for
copyright protection extended to the author’s life plus 70 years. 30
Another important feature of fixation is that only a fixed work
in a tangible form is considered a writing within the meaning of the
United States Constitution. 31 That is, under the “Intellectual Property
Clause,” Congress has the explicit power to grant copyright protection
for an author’s writing. 32 Based on the language of that clause,
Nimmer argues that the Constitution requires fixation of a work in
some tangible form for protection under copyright law because only
then will the work be considered a writing. 33 As further discussed in
Part III.A, the Supreme Court considers a photograph to be a writing
consistent with the fixation requirement. 34
2. Originality and Creativity
Next, the Constitution requires that the work is original. 35 To
satisfy the originality requirement, the copyright holder must
“independently create[]” the work. 36 Because originality is not
equivalent to novelty, “a work may be original even though it closely
resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the
result of copying.” 37 The originality of a work also requires creativity;
however, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low” and only
“a slight amount will suffice.” 38 While facts are not copyrightable
because they “do not owe their origin to an act of authorship,” 39 factual
28 Id. § 102(a)(5). “‘Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ include two-dimensional and
three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art
reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including
architectural plans.” Id. § 101.
29 MENELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 495.
30 Id. at 613-14.
31 NIMMER, supra note 21, § 2.03[B].
32 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
33 NIMMER, supra note 21, § 2.03[B].
34 For an explanation of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of photographs and writings,
see Part III.A.
35 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
36 Id. at 345 (citation omitted).
37 Id. For example, if two poets wrote the exact same poem, the works will be original as
long as the poets were not aware of the other’s poem. Id. at 346.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 347.
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compilations may be original if the author’s choices in the selection
and arrangement of the facts are original. 40 Similarly, an author’s
originality is essential because there is no copyright protection for
mere ideas or concepts. 41 In fact, while “photographers cannot
copyright their underlying subject matter . . . courts agree that the
original judgments that photographers make in composing images are
protectable.” 42 Therefore, as long as the “photographer arranges or
otherwise creates the subject that his camera captures,” the work may
have the necessary originality to be protectable. 43
Over the years, the courts have articulated several protectable
photographic elements that satisfy the required originality. 44 For
example, “[e]lements of originality in a photograph may include
posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and camera,
evoking the desired expression, and almost any other variant
involved.” 45 These other variants may include clothing, accessories,
and shade. 46 Other elements include the type of lens, the exact timing
of when to take the photograph, the area where the photograph is taken,
and the subject matter for the photograph. 47 One court even found
protection in the photographer’s artistic choice in the “skin tone of the
subject.” 48 Protectable elements also include “the amount of the image
in focus, its graininess, and the level of contrast.” 49 While this list
illustrates only some of the protectable photographic elements, it
exemplifies the required degree of originality that a photographer must
display when taking a photograph.
Id. at 348
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2019) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work.”).
42 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 11. “Any one may take a photograph of
a public building and of the surrounding scene. It undoubtedly requires originality to determine
just when to take the photograph, so as to bring out the proper setting for both animate and
inanimate objects, with the adjunctive features of light, shade, position, etc.” Pagano v. Chas.
Beseler Co., 234 F. 963, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
43 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
44 Id.
45 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992).
46 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 55 (1884). For a discussion of
Burrow-Giles and its role in recognizing that photographs are protected under copyright law,
see Part III.A.
47 E. Am. Trio Prods., Inc. v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
48 Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 1998).
49 Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 450 n.37.
40
41
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Elements of Copyright Infringement

To succeed on a claim of copyright infringement, the copyright
holder needs to establish “ownership of a valid copyright” and the
“copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” 50 To
prove ownership of the copyright, the copyright holder must show that
his work qualifies as one of the “original works of authorship” under
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act as discussed in the previous
section. 51 The copyright holder can file suit for copyright infringement
in this instance only after the work has been registered with the
Copyright Office. 52 Next, the second element requires “copying and
unlawful appropriation.” 53 First, the copyright holder has to establish
that his work was copied “because independent creation is a complete
defense to copyright infringement.” 54 As long as the defendant created
his work “without knowledge of or exposure to the plaintiff’s work,”
there is no copyright infringement. 55 However, when there is no
evidence of direct copying, the copyright holder only needs to establish
the defendant’s access to the work and that the “works share
similarities probative of copying.” 56 Typically, the inverse ratio rule
is applied in cases assessing the similarity of two works when a
plaintiff cannot directly prove that the defendant copied his work. 57
Under the inverse ratio rule, the courts “require a lower standard of
proof on substantial similarity when a high degree of access is

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2019).
52 See Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 888, 892
(2019) (explaining that under the registration approach, a work is registered, and the copyright
holder can file suit for copyright infringement, only after the Copyright Office examined the
copyright application and registered the work).
53 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977).
54 Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct.
1375 (2019).
55 Id.; see Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (“Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be
original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous,
not the result of copying.”).
56 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1117. “To prove copying, the similarities between the two
works need not be extensive, and they need not involve protected elements of the plaintiff’s
work.” Id.
57 Id. at 1124.
50
51
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shown.” 58 Similarly, if two works have compelling similarities, a
lessened degree of access is required. 59
Second, the copyright holder has to prove “unlawful
appropriation,” or the illicit and unlawful copying of the work. 60 To
show unlawful appropriation, “the two works must be ‘substantial’ and
they must involve protected elements of the plaintiff’s work.” 61 For
unlawful appropriation, the inverse ratio test is not applied because
proof of access is not relevant. 62 This part of the test only focuses on
the “balance between the protection” provided to authors and the
copying of too much protected expression. 63 Thus, unlawful
appropriation differs from the copying part of the test because proof of
access does not have any bearing on unlawful appropriation. 64 For
photographs, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant “copied
enough of the photo’s protected expression to render their works
‘substantially similar.’” 65 The following subsection will explain how
the Ninth Circuit examines the substantial similarity of two works.
C.

Ninth Circuit Test for Substantial Similarity

For substantial similarity, the Ninth Circuit uses a two-part test
that includes “an objective extrinsic test and a subjective intrinsic
test.” 66 Under the extrinsic test, “analytic dissection and expert
testimony are appropriate” in order to assess the specific objective
criteria of the works. 67 For photographs, the extrinsic test analyzes
protectable elements, including the light, pose, angle, and type of
lens. 68 As part of the extrinsic test, the “court must filter out and
58 Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d
1353, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1990)); Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1172.
59 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1124.
60 Id. at 1117.
61 Id. (citing Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992)).
62 Id. at 1124-25.
63 Id. at 1124 (citation omitted).
64 Id. at 1124-25.
65 Id. at 1118.
66 Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004).
67 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977).
68 See SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(“What makes plaintiff’s photographs original is the totality of the precise lighting selection,
angle of the camera, lens and filter selection.”). For a list of other original elements in a
photograph, see supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
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disregard the non-protectible elements in making its substantial
similarity determination.” 69 Because the extrinsic test does not involve
the trier of fact’s analysis of objective elements, the extrinsic test can
be decided as a matter of law. 70 However, as the dissenting opinion
proposes in Rentmeester, the courts should consider whether it is
appropriate to decide the substantial similarity of two works as a matter
of law because this analysis is “inherently factual.” 71 Next, under the
subjective intrinsic test, the jury is presented with “whether the
ordinary, reasonable person would find the total concept and feel of
the works to be substantially similar.” 72 Unlike the extrinsic test, the
intrinsic test does not allow “analytic dissection and expert
testimony.” 73 While the circuits do not apply the exact test for
substantial similarity, other circuits follow a test that is consistent with
the Ninth Circuit’s approach. 74 For example, the Eighth Circuit
implemented the Ninth Circuit’s two-part test, and the Sixth Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit follow an adapted version of the Ninth Circuit’s
test. 75
III.

PHOTOGRAPHY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CASES

To provide a proper analysis of the photographs in Rentmeester
v. Nike, Inc., this Note will discuss relevant past photography cases.
First, this section will examine Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, 76 one of the seminal photography cases, and it will evaluate its
impact on subsequent photography infringement cases. Second, this
section will specifically examine photography cases from the First,
Second, and Eleventh Circuits. The application of copyright law in

Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002).
Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
71 Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1127 (Owens, J., dissenting) (9th Cir. 2018),
cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 1375 (2019). For an explanation of the dissenting opinion’s argument
relating to copyright infringement cases decided as a matter of law, see infra notes 241-46.
72 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pasillas
v. McDonald’s Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 1991)).
73 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. For an explanation of the tests used in the Second Circuit, see
infra note 145 and accompanying text.
74 See generally 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03
(providing an extensive discussion of each circuit’s test for substantial similarity).
75 Id. § 13.03[E][3][d] (comparing the Eighth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits with the Ninth
Circuit’s test for substantial similarity).
76 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
69
70
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these photography cases will serve as a direct comparison to the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis in a subsequent section of this Note. 77
A.

Leading Photography Cases

On March 3, 1865, Congress extended copyright protection to
authors of photographs and photographic negatives. 78 Through this
amendment of the Copyright Act, Congress provided benefits to the
authors of photographs “in the same manner, and to the same extent,
and upon the same conditions as to the authors of prints and
engravings.” 79 Although Congress recognized the protection of
photographs in 1865, the Supreme Court’s decision in the 1884 case
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony 80 bolstered the recognition
of photographs as protectable works.
In Burrow-Giles, Napoleon Sarony, a photographer,
photographed Oscar Wilde in New York. 81 After Sarony took the
“publicity photographs” for Wilde, he “registered his images with the
Copyright Office.” 82 Sarony commenced the lawsuit against BurrowGiles, a lithographic company, when it sold 85,000 copies of Sarony’s
photograph, titled “Oscar Wilde, No. 18.” 83 Burrow-Giles argued that
“a photograph is not a writing nor the production of an author” because
it is merely “a reproduction, on paper, of the exact features of some
natural object, or of some person.” 84 Unlike a painting or engraving,
the company argued that a photograph is a “mere mechanical
reproduction” of living or inanimate objects in nature, without any
novelty or originality when it is reproduced in photographic form. 85
Contrary to Congress’s intent under the 1865 amendment to the
Copyright Act, that argument suggested that protection for
photographs went beyond the realm of “intellectual property rights
permitted by the Constitution.” 86
For a discussion of the circuit split, see Part V.
See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, §1, 13 Stat. 540, 540.
79 Id.
80 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
81 Id. at 54.
82 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 8.
83 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S at 54.
84 Id. at 56.
85 Id. at 59.
86 Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5,
Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 18-728).
77
78
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However, the Court dismissed Burrow-Giles’ arguments for
several reasons. First, the Court explained that copyright protection is
not confined to actual written works, but it includes all works “by
which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible
expression.” 87 Although the Constitution only expressly indicates that
there is protection in an author’s writing, the Court explained that a
writing is not limited to an author’s words. 88 Instead, a writing is
meant to encompass “the literary productions” of authors. 89 In this
way, photographs are similar to “maps, charts, designs, engravings,
etchings, cuts, and other prints” as protected works under copyright
law. 90 Next, the Court found that Sarony’s photograph of Oscar Wilde
possessed the required originality and “intellectual invention” to be
protected under the Constitution.91 Specifically, the Court explained:
[I]n regard to the photograph in question, that it is a
‘useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and graceful
picture, and that plaintiff made the same . . . entirely
from his own original mental conception, to which he
gave visible form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in
front of the camera, selecting and arranging the
costume, draperies, and other various accessories in
said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present
graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and
shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression,
and from such disposition, arrangement, or
representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he produced
the picture in suit.’ 92
In Burrow-Giles, the Wilde photograph was protected under
the Constitution because it embodied Sarony’s “original choices” and
“artistic judgments.” 93 For example, Sarony orchestrated the entire
photograph by arranging and selecting various features, including the

Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58.
Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 57.
91 Id. at 60. “We entertain no doubt that the Constitution is broad enough to cover an act
authorizing copyright of photographs, so far as they are representatives of original intellectual
conceptions of the author.” Id. at 58.
92 Id. at 60 (citation omitted).
93 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 38.
87
88
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costume, draperies, light, shade, Wilde’s pose, and other elements. 94
Under the Court’s analysis, “the same ‘intellectual innovation’ that
entitles a photograph to protection in the first place also provides
protection for the photograph’s expression of the original elements
within it.” 95 Burrow-Giles is one of the leading cases on photography
copyright infringement because it holds that while the underlying
subject of a photograph is not copyrightable, the photographer’s
original and creative choices are protectable. 96
Subsequently, in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,97
the Court supported the protection for a photographer’s original
choices. 98 In this case, Bleistein sued the Donaldson Lithographing
Company because that company copied three chromolithographs made
for circus advertisements for a circus owned by Wallace. 99 The Court
found that pictures in the form of an advertisement are protected under
copyright law because it “is none the less a picture, and none the less
a subject of copyright.” 100 Specifically, the Court recognized that each
photographic element “is the personal reaction of an individual upon
nature,” warranting copyright protection. 101 Lastly, the Court
cautioned that it is not the role of the courts to determine the artistic
value of “pictorial illustrations.” 102
These two Supreme Court cases demonstrate the importance of
a photographer’s originality in a photograph. In Burrow-Giles, the
Supreme Court explained that photographs are entitled to copyright
protection as long as the photographer exhibited original and creative
judgments. 103 In this case, Sarony made several original and artistic
choices while photographing Wilde that came from his own
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 55. “Wilde’s image is not copyrightable; but to the extent a
photograph reflects the photographer’s decisions regarding pose, positioning, background,
lighting, shading, and the like, those elements can be said to ‘owe their origins’ to the
photographer, making the photograph copyrightable, at least to that extent.” Meshwerks, Inc.
v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 2008).
95 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 39.
96 Id. at 11.
97 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
98 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 11.
99 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 248.
100 Id. at 251.
101 Id. at 250.
102 Id. at 251. “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits.” Id.
103 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
94
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“intellectual invention.” 104 However, the Court implied that not every
photograph is entitled to copyright protection, specifically
photographic works lacking an author’s thought and originality.105
Next, the Court in Bleistein further discussed the originality
requirement by eliminating any distinction in copyright protection
between an advertisement and “the fine arts.” 106 That is, any
photographic work capturing an author’s personality and originality
will likely be copyrightable. 107 Overall, Burrow-Giles and Bleistein
serve as essential cases in the evaluation of copyright protection for
photographic works.
B.

Circuit Court Cases

In the cases discussed below from the First, Second, and
Eleventh Circuits, the courts upheld the principle that copyright law
protects a photographer’s original and creative choices. 108 The
analysis of these circuits will serve as a direct comparison to the Ninth
Circuit’s application of copyright law in Rentmeester. Then, in Part
V, the protection granted for a photographer’s original choices in these
circuits will be directly compared to the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in
Rentmeester.
1.

First Circuit

In Harney v. Sony Pictures Television, Inc., 109 the First
Circuit’s decision hinged on a comparison between the protectable and
unprotectable elements of a photograph. In this case, Donald Harney,
a freelancer, took a photograph “of a blond girl in a pink coat riding
piggyback on her father’s shoulders as they emerged from a Palm
Sunday service in the Beacon Hill section of Boston.” 110 After
discovering that the father in the photograph was a German citizen who
Id. at 60.
See id.
106 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
107 Id. at 250. “Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity
even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is
one man’s alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the words
of the act.” Id.
108 The Ninth Circuit supports the protection for photographs, but it misapplied the law by
failing to find protection for individual photographic elements.
109 704 F.3d 173 (1st Cir. 2013).
110 Id. at 176.
104
105
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abducted his daughter, the FBI used Harney’s photograph in a
“Wanted” poster. 111 Then, Sony made a televised movie about the
events, depicting Harney’s photograph. 112 Subsequently, Harney filed
suit for copyright infringement against Warner Brothers for allegedly
copying his photograph. 113
The First Circuit recognized several protectable elements in
Harney’s photograph, including the framing of the father and daughter
“against the background of the church and blue sky, with each holding
a symbol of Palm Sunday” and “the bright colors alongside the
prominent shadows.” 114 However, none of these protectable elements
were replicated in Warner Brothers’ photograph. 115 Instead, the
similarities between the photographs were based on unprotectable
elements. 116 For example, the court explained that “subject matter that
the photographer did not create” is treated as mere unprotectable facts
or ideas. 117 In this case, while the two photographs seem similar, “that
impression of similarity is due largely to the piggyback pose that was
not Harney’s creation and is arguably so common that it would not be
protected even if Harney had placed” the father and daughter. 118 The
court recognized that there may be protection for photographs taken of
fleeting events “when the photographer does not simply take her
subject ‘as is,’ but arranges or otherwise creates the content by, for
example, posing her subjects or suggesting facial expressions.” 119
However, because Harney simply shot the father and daughter without
making any choices in arranging them, the First Circuit held that
Warner Brothers was not liable for copyright infringement. 120
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, “the First Circuit takes a far broader
view of photographers’ artistry than does the Ninth Circuit.” 121 The
difference between Harney’s photograph and Rentmeester’s
111

Id.
Id. “Sony depicted the Photo in that movie using an image that was similar in pose and
composition to Harney’s original, but different in a number of details.” Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 186.
115 Id. In fact, “the two photographs are notably different in lighting and coloring, giving
them aesthetically dissimilar impacts.” Id. at 187.
116 See id. at 186.
117 Id at 181. According to the First Circuit, subject matter that cannot be created by a
photographer includes “a person, a building, [or] a landscape.” Id.
118 Id. at 186-87.
119 Id. at 180-81.
120 Id. at 182, 188.
121 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 29.
112
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photograph is that Harney spontaneously shot a photograph of the
father and daughter, while Rentmeester purposefully staged and
instructed Jordan’s position in his photograph. 122 For a staged
photograph like Rentmeester’s work, “copyright law requires a more
dynamic measure of protection for originality” 123 because the
photographer’s original choices in arranging the subject of the
photograph create “a protectible expressive work.” 124 In contrast,
Harney did not create the main subject of his photograph, thereby
likening the subject to unprotectable facts. 125 However, the First
Circuit applied a broader application of protection for Harney’s
photograph when it recognized his “artistic flair,” “artistry,” and
“aesthetic judgments” in the photograph. 126 For example, the court
acknowledged his originality and creativity in the color tones and
framing of the father and daughter in the photograph. 127 Although
Sony did not copy these original and protectable elements, the First
Circuit respected the protection for Harney’s choices in his
spontaneous photograph that produced “a distinctive, original
image.” 128 Compared to the First Circuit, the Ninth Circuit did not
provide the same protections for Rentmeester’s original choices in his
staged photograph of Jordan. 129
2.

Second Circuit

Although the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit are the two
principal appellate courts for deciding photograph infringement cases,
the Second Circuit, like the First Circuit, conflicts with the Ninth
Circuit’s narrow and limited application of copyright protection for
photographs. 130
122 See id. at 28 (explaining that Harney’s photograph and Nike’s photograph required a
different analysis of copyright protection).
123 Id.
124 Harney, 704 F.3d at 181.
125 Id. at 184.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 186.
128 Id.
129 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 28 (“Further, even while ruling
against Harney, the First Circuit displayed a considerably more robust vision of copyright
protection for his spontaneous snapshot than the Ninth Circuit extended to the staged
Rentmeester photo of Jordan.”). For a discussion of Rentmeester’s original choices in his
staged photograph of Jordan, see Part IV.A.
130 Id. at 29.
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In Rogers v. Koons, 131 Jim Scanlon hired Art Rogers to
photograph his eight German Shepherd puppies. 132 Rogers exhibited
“[s]ubstantial creative effort” while taking the photograph and while
at his lab. 133 For example, Rogers chose to photograph Scanlon and
his wife with the eight puppies, and he made several selections in “the
light, the location, the bench on which the Scanlons are seated and the
arrangement of the small dogs.” 134 Then, he “made creative judgments
concerning technical matters with his camera and the use of natural
light.” 135 After preparing 50 images from the photography session, one
photograph, later entitled “Puppies,” was selected for the Scanlons to
purchase. 136 Afterward, Rogers enjoyed success in this black and
white photograph for other professional purposes. 137
Subsequently, after coming across “Puppies” on a notecard in
a tourist store, Jeff Koons, an artist, and sculptor, decided to
incorporate it in his upcoming sculpture exhibition show. 138 Koons
told his artisans “to copy” the photograph of “Puppies” for the
sculpture. 139 The colorized sculpture of “Puppies,” entitled “String of
Puppies,” was featured at gallery exhibitions and on the cover page of
a newspaper calendar. 140 However, Rogers did not authorize Koons to
use “Puppies” for his sculpture, resulting in Rogers’ suit for copyright
infringement against Koons. 141
Here, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision
that Koons infringed Rogers’ copyright in “Puppies.” 142 Specifically,
the Second Circuit agreed with the district court “that no reasonable
juror could find that copying did not occur in this case.” 143 Unlike
most photograph infringement cases, this case was an outlier because
there was direct evidence that Koons authorized the direct copying of

960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 304.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 305.
139 Id. In fact, “[i]n his ‘production notes’ Koons stressed that he wanted ‘Puppies’ copied
faithfully in the sculpture.” Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 306.
143 Id. at 307.
131
132
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“Puppies,” resulting in the grant of summary judgment for Rogers. 144
However, even in the absence of direct evidence, there would still be
copyright infringement based on Koons’ access to “Puppies” and the
substantial similarity between the two works. 145
Specifically, the Second Circuit explained that it is not the idea
of eight puppies seated with the couple that is protected, but it is the
photographer’s “expression of this idea.” 146 For example, there is
copyright protection “in the placement, in the particular light, and in
the expressions of the subjects.” 147 If Koons had created his own
expression of the idea of these puppies rather than copying Rogers’
expression, then he may not have been subject to copyright
infringement based on a lack of substantial similarity. 148 However,
while Koons added flowers to the couple’s hair and accentuated the
puppies’ bulbous noses, “the overwhelming similarity to the protected
expression of the original work” outweighed these minor differences
for finding substantial similarity. 149 Lastly, this case is particularly
important because it highlights the protection in a photographer’s
original choices. 150 The court stated, “Rogers’ inventive efforts in
144

Id.
Id. “Such similarity is determined by the ordinary observer test: the inquiry is ‘whether
an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from
the copyrighted work.’” Id. (quoting Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d
Cir. 1966)). The Second Circuit also applies an abstraction test, which requires the court to
break down the work into its structural elements and filter out the non-protectable elements.
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1992).
146 Koons, 960 F.2d at 308.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 For a discussion of original elements that are protected under copyright law, see supra
notes 44-49. In another Second Circuit case, the court found that while there is “no protection
for the appearance in [the photographer’s] photograph of the body of a nude, pregnant female,”
there is copyright protection in the photographer’s original and creative expression in
photographing the woman’s body. Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 11516 (2d Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, the court held that the fair use defense applied for Paramount.
Id. at 110. For an explanation of the four fair use elements, see supra note 16. In Leibovitz,
Paramount’s parodic advertisement of Leibovitz’s photograph was transformative. 137 F.3d
at 114. In particular, “the smirking face of Nielsen contrasts so strikingly with the serious
expression on the face of Moore” that the advertisement appears to ridicule and comment on
the original photograph. Id. Next, although the second factor favors Leibovitz because her
“photograph exhibited significant creative expression,” this factor is not heavily weighted in
considering fair use for parodic works. Id. at 115. While Paramount’s advertisement
extensively copied several protectable elements, such as the lighting and camera angle, this
third factor has minimal “weight against fair use so long as the first and fourth factors favor
the parodist.” Id. at 116. Here, the fourth factor also favors Paramount because the parodic
advertisement did not interfere with the market for Leibovitz’s work. Id. While fair use
145
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posing the group for the photograph, taking the picture, and printing
‘Puppies’ suffices to meet the original work of art criteria.”151
Therefore, a photographer’s creative expression in the elements of a
photograph “makes it original and copyrightable.” 152
3.

Eleventh Circuit

In Leigh v. Warner Brothers, Inc., 153 the Eleventh Circuit’s
reversal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the
defendant 154 represents another important case that contrasts with the
Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Rentmeester. In this case, Jack Leigh
photographed “the Bird Girl statue in Savannah’s Bonaventure
Cemetery that appears on the cover of the best-selling novel Midnight
in the Garden of Good and Evil.” 155 Leigh sued Warner Brothers,
claiming that Warner Brothers infringed his photograph in the movie
version of the novel and in promotional advertisements. 156
While the Eleventh Circuit rejected the claim of infringement
for the film sequences, the court further analyzed Leigh’s photograph
and the promotional photographs. 157 The court explained that while
there are identifiable differences between the two works, the Warner
Brothers’ photographs are similar to many of the protectable elements
of Leigh’s photograph. 158 In Leigh’s photograph, the protectable
elements include “the selection of lighting, shading, timing, angle, and

applied, this case is important to show that the photographer was “entitled to protection for
such artistic elements as the particular lighting, the resulting skin tone of the subject, and the
camera angle that she selected.” Id. Therefore, this case supports the Second Circuit’s
decision in Koons because it protects the photographer’s original choices and judgments.
151 Koons, 960 F.2d at 307.
152 Id. at 308. In another photograph case involving Koons, the Second Circuit found that
the fair use defense applied to Koons’ photograph because he took a reasonable amount of the
plaintiff’s work and there was no negative effect on the market. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d
244, 258 (2d Cir. 2006).
153 212 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2000).
154 Id. at 1219.
155 Id. at 1212.
156 Id. at 1212-13.
157 Id. at 1215-16. For the film sequences, the court held that they “have nothing substantial
in common with Leigh’s photograph except the statue itself.” Id. For instance, the film
sequences were taken in a different part of the Bonaventure Cemetery from Leigh’s
photograph, resulting in different “gravestones and greenery” shown in the works. Id. at 1215.
158 Id. at 1216. Some differences are the appearance of the size of the statue, the lighting
contrast, and specific additions in the Warner Brothers photographs, including “a green or
orange tint” and “a Celtic cross and tree.” Id.
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film.” 159 In particular, both “photographs are taken from a low
position, angled up slightly at the Bird Girl.” In addition, the tops of
the photographs are bordered with Spanish moss, and the shining light
“envelopes the statue.” 160
The Eleventh Circuit held that the lower court erred in deciding
this case as a matter of law. 161 Because “[c]opyright infringement is
generally a question of fact for the jury to decide,” the court mistakenly
held “that no reasonable jury” would find that the photographs were
substantially similar. 162 Based on the similar photographic elements
between the photographs, including the lighting, hanging Spanish
moss, and positing of the camera angle, the court reasoned that these
similarities were enough to prevent summary judgment.163
Interestingly, even if a jury found that the protected photographic
elements were not substantially similar, the court explained that the
similarities were sufficient to at least avoid summary judgment.164
Therefore, the Eleventh’s Circuit’s deference to the jury as the trier of
fact is an essential part of the analysis that is missing in Rentmeester.
IV.

BACKGROUND OF RENTMEESTER V. NIKE, INC.
A.

Rentmeester and the Jordan Photograph

Rentmeester is esteemed for creating “some of the most
memorable images of the twentieth century.” 165 His photographs were
on the cover of at least sixty-seven magazines, and his photograph of
an American tank commander in the Vietnam War is respected as the
first time a color photograph won the World Press Photo of the Year
award. 166 Before becoming a photographer, he was an Olympic
oarsman for the Netherlands. 167 His athleticism influenced his
photography because he became “well-known for photographing top
athletes in original, surprising, and iconic ways.” 168
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Id. at 1215 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1213.
Id.
Id. at 1216.
Id.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 13.
Id. at 13, 15.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 15.
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In 1984, Rentmeester created a photo collection of athletes
competing in the Summer Olympics that year for Life Magazine.169
The photograph of Jordan, who was a student at the University of
North Carolina, was included in this collection. 170 For several reasons,
the photograph “is highly staged and manifests significant creativity
and technical skill.” 171 For example, Rentmeester wanted to take the
photograph outside and away from the traditional basketball arena. 172
He further instructed his assistants to cut the grass very low in order to
eliminate “visual distractions.” 173 Also, he chose where he wanted to
place the basketball pole and removed “any indication of basketball
aside from a hoop, backboard, and pole.” 174
Next, Rentmeester was inspired to pose Jordan based on his
experiences with taking photographs at the American Ballet Theatre. 175
Rentmeester envisioned that the ballet-inspired pose would appear to
be “a gravity-defying dunk” to the viewer. 176 Under Rentmeester’s
direction, Jordan continuously practiced this unusual and artificial
pose. 177 Specifically, Rentmeester had Jordan “jump with his body
open and facing the camera, his left leg forward, and his left hand
extended while holding the perched basketball.” 178 Interestingly, as
Jordan typically dunks using his right hand, it “was a creative, nonobvious decision” to arrange Jordan on the left side of the basketball
hoop because it differs from the typical photos of Jordan dunking the
basketball. 179
Additionally, Rentmeester made several creative and artistic
judgments with his camera. 180 For example, he used “a fast shutter
speed synchronized with a powerful set of carefully-arranged outdoor
strobe lights” in order to capture “a sharp silhouette of Jordan’s full
figure against a contrasting solid background.” 181 Also, Rentmeester
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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perfectly timed pressing the shutter-release on his camera when Jordan
was at the highest point of his leap. 182 Lastly, Rentmeester made
several choices with his lens in order to create “a deep depth of
field.” 183
B.

The Success of Rentmeester’s Photograph

Remarkably, TIME Magazine recognized Rentmeester’s
photograph as one of the most influential photographs in the world.184
Initially, TIME wanted to assemble 100 of the most influential and
powerful “images that changed the world.” 185 Undoubtedly, this “was
an exhaustive process,” and experts were essential for narrowing down
the vast number of iconic photographs. 186 In the end, 100 of the most
influential images from 1826 to the present day were selected. 187
During this process, the authors of this project considered what
makes a photograph influential. 188 The authors stated, “[s]ome images
are on our list because they were the first of their kind, others because
they shaped the way we think. And some made the cut because they
directly changed the way we live. What all 100 share is that they are
turning points in our human experience.” 189 For TIME, Rentmeester’s
photograph deserved a spot on this list because it was perhaps “the
most famous silhouette ever photographed.” 190

182

Id.
Id. “A photographer varies the depth of field by choosing the lens, varying the aperture
size (the F-stop number), and varying the focal distance. By employing an atypically deep
depth of field, Rentmeester rendered all visual elements in focus, dramatizing Jordan’s dunk.”
Id.
184 The Most Influential Images of All Time, TIME 100PHOTOS, http://100photos.time.com/
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
185 Id.
186
About the Project, TIME 100PHOTOS, http://100photos.time.com/about (last visited
Nov. 24, 2019).
187
The Most Influential Images of All Time, supra note 184. For example, “Migrant
Mother” by Dorothea Lange in 1936, “V-J Day in Times Square” by Alfred Eisenstaedt in
1945, “The Pillow Fight” of the Beatles by Harry Benson in 1964, “A Man on the Moon”
photograph of Neil Armstrong in 1969, and “Oscars Selfie” taken by Bradley Cooper and
posted on Twitter by Ellen DeGeneres in 2014 are just five examples that are part of the
collection of 100 of the most iconic photographs. Id.
188 About the Project, supra note 186.
189 Id.
190 Michael Jordan, TIME 100PHOTOS, http://100photos.time.com/photos/co-rentmeestermichael-jordan (last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
183
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Nike’s Photograph and Jumpman Logo

Interestingly, TIME described Rentmeester’s “beautiful
image” as “one unlikely to have endured had Nike not devised a logo
for its young star that bore a striking resemblance to the photo.”191
Around the time that Rentmeester’s photograph of Jordan was
published, “Nike and Jordan entered into their well-known
endorsement relationship.” 192 Nike asked Rentmeester for color
transparencies of his Jordan photograph for their marketing
Rentmeester allowed Nike to use “two color
campaign. 193
transparencies for $150 under a limited license authorizing Nike to use
the transparencies ‘for slide presentation only.’” 194
However, Nike violated the terms of the agreement when it
“hired a photographer to produce its own photograph of Jordan, one
obviously inspired by Rentmeester’s.” 195 In Nike’s photograph,
Jordan is also leaping towards the “basketball hoop with a basketball
held in his left hand above his head, as though he is about to dunk the
ball.” 196 Also, both photographs have an outdoors setting and are taken
from an angle looking up at Jordan. 197 The differences appear to be
the Chicago skyline in the background, the color of Jordan’s team on
his clothing, and the Nike shoes. 198 Nonetheless, Nike’s photograph
was successfully displayed on posters and billboards. 199 To avoid
litigation after Rentmeester threatened to sue Nike, they entered into
an agreement in which Nike paid $15,000 to use its photo on billboards
and posters for two more years. 200 However, Rentmeester claimed that
Nike used the photograph beyond the two-year term. 201 In fact, Nike’s
“Jumpman” logo, which is “a solid black silhouette that tracks the
outline of Jordan’s figure as it appears in the Nike photo,” has

191

Id.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 18.
193 Id.
194 Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct.
1375 (2019).
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id. For the Ninth Circuit’s list of the differences between the photographs, see infra
notes 236-39.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
192
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produced “billions of dollars of merchandise.” 202 With its famous logo
and branding of sports celebrities, Nike further “created the concept of
athletes as valuable commercial properties unto themselves.” 203
It is possible that Rentmeester’s photograph would not enjoy
the same popularity today had it not been for Nike’s photograph and
“Jumpman” logo. In fact, TIME’s recognition of Rentmeester’s
photograph as the initiation of the rise “of sports celebrity into a
multibillion-dollar business” would most likely not have been possible
without Nike. 204 At the same time, Nike’s “Jumpman” logo and its
promotional advertisements with its version of the Jordan photograph
may not have been as successful without Rentmeester’s photograph.
However, the continued success of each photograph has no bearing on
the analysis of substantial similarity. Instead, as the following part will
examine, the Nike and Rentmeester photographs appear to be
substantially similar despite the Ninth Circuit’s findings.
D.

The District Court’s Analysis

In 2015, almost three decades after Nike took its photograph,
Rentmeester filed suit for copyright infringement. 205 Because
“Rentmeester’s livelihood was commercial photography, and he did
not want to put that at risk by filing a copyright lawsuit against one of
the world’s most important advertisers,” he waited until his retirement
to sue Nike. 206 Thus, Rentmeester’s suit of copyright infringement
only sought damages from “January 2012 to the present” if the court
found infringement, the period within the three-year statute of
limitations under the Copyright Act. 207
For several reasons, which are mostly endorsed by the Ninth
Circuit, the district court granted Nike’s motion to dismiss the claim of
copyright infringement. 208 The district court explained “that very little
202

Id.
Michael Jordan, supra note 190.
204 Id.
205 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1116.
206 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 20 n.1.
207 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1116; see Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S.
663, 671 (2014) (“Under the Act’s three-year provision, an infringement is actionable within
three years, and only three years, of its occurrence. And the infringer is insulated from
liability for earlier infringements of the same work.”).
208 Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-00113-MO, 2015 WL 3766546, at *8 (D. Or.
June 15, 2015).
203
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of the selection and arrangement is original” because Rentmeester only
captured the idea of Jordan leaping towards the basketball hoop in a
grand-jeté pose. 209 According to the court, “[t]he only arguably
original” aspect of Rentmeester’s photograph is that it was shot outside
rather than in a gym. 210 However, the district court dismissed this
original element as “not all that original” because basketball is played
outdoors every day. 211 For the district court, unlike the Ninth Circuit,
Rentmeester’s photograph was only entitled to “thin protection”
because there is a “narrow range of expression” to express the idea in
the photograph. 212 Next, the district court explained that while
Rentmeester is entitled to protection for his expression of the balletinspired pose, the two photographs have “several material differences”
in the positioning of Jordan’s arms and legs. 213 For the district court,
this meant that the photographs were not substantially similar under a
thin protection analysis because the photographs “are not virtually
identical.” 214 Lastly, the district court dismissed any substantial
similarities after completing the filtering process of the photographs,
explaining that “there are few if any similarities.” 215
E.

The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis in Rentmeester v.
Nike, Inc.

Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
holding, finding that Rentmeester’s photograph and Nike’s photograph
were not substantially similar as a matter of law. 216 First, the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged that Rentmeester satisfied the first element for
copyright infringement by showing that he has a valid copyright in his

Id. at *6.
Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at *5; see Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1120 (“When only a narrow range of expression
is possible, copyright protection is thin because the copyrighted work will contain few
protectable features.”); see also Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir.
2003) (explaining that despite the similarities between the photographs, a vodka bottle is only
entitled to thin copyright protection because there are only a few creative ways to photograph
the bottle). For a discussion of broad copyright protection, see infra notes 232-33 and
accompanying text.
213 Rentmeester, 2015 WL 3766546, at *6.
214 Id.
215 Id. at *7.
216 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1125.
209
210
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photograph. 217 For the second element, Rentmeester gave Nike the
color transparencies of the Jordan photograph, establishing that
“Nike’s access to Rentmeester’s photo, combined with the obvious
conceptual similarities . . . is sufficient to create a presumption that the
Nike photo was the product of copying rather than independent
creation.” 218 For the second part of the second element, Rentmeester
had to show unlawful appropriation of his work, which requires an
analysis of substantial similarity. 219
For substantial similarity, the Ninth Circuit explained that the
protectable and unprotectable elements of a photograph are dissected
and filtered differently from other works. 220 In photographs, the
objective elements 221 are not protectable “when viewed in
isolation.” 222 As long as two photographs are not substantially similar,
a photographer cannot prevent another photographer from using his
“wholly original subject matter by having someone pose in an unusual
or distinctive way.” 223 The Ninth Circuit explained that Rentmeester
cannot copyright Jordan’s pose and prevent another photographer from
using that pose. 224 Instead, he is only given protection for the way in
which the pose is expressed through other objective elements,
including “the camera angle, timing, and shutter speed.” 225
Essentially, the Ninth Circuit held that “copyright law does not
protect the individual expressive elements in an image,” 226 but only
“the photographer’s selection and arrangement of the photo’s
otherwise unprotected elements.” 227 According to the court, these
individual elements are the same as “unprotectable ‘facts’ that anyone
may use to create new works.” 228 In a factual compilation, the
Id. at 1117-18
Id. at 1118.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 1119.
221 For a list of objective elements, see supra notes 44-49.
222 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1119.
223 Id.
224 Id. The Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit appear to agree that specific poses may not
be copyrightable. While a pose is not copyrightable, a photographer may be given copyright
protection if such pose is arranged in a creative and original manner. However, the Ninth
Circuit strayed from the Second Circuit when it ignored the expressive and individual creative
expressions in creating an original pose. See discussion infra notes 254-57.
225 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1119
226 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 22.
227 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1119.
228 Id. at 1120.
217
218
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underlying facts are not protectable and are free to be used by anyone
in another work. 229 However, if the facts are arranged and selected in
an original manner, the work may be protected under copyright law. 230
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit views individual photographic elements as
unprotectable and only the author’s original selection and arrangement
of these elements are protectable. 231
Unlike the district court’s analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that
Rentmeester’s photograph was entitled to broad protection. 232 The
court stated that “[t]he range of creative choices open to Rentmeester
in producing his photo was exceptionally broad; very few of those
choices were dictated by convention or subject matter.” 233 However,
the Ninth Circuit believed that the two photographs were only similar
in their overall idea. 234 These concepts include “Michael Jordan
attempting to dunk in a pose inspired by ballet’s grand jeté,” the
“outdoor setting stripped of most of the traditional trappings of
basketball,” and “a camera angle that captures the subject silhouetted
against the sky.” 235 While the photographs share these similar features
“at the conceptual level,” both photographs differ in their selection and
arrangement of photographic elements. 236 The Ninth Circuit held that
the differences between the photographs included the position of
Jordan’s limbs, the position of the hoops, the background, the setting,
and the position of Jordan and the hoop within the frame. 237 According
to the court, unlike the hoop in Nike’s photograph, the hoop in
Rentmeester’s photograph is beyond any person’s reach to dunk the
basketball, creating a “whimsical rather than realistic nature of the
depiction.” 238 Also, in Nike’s photograph, Jordan is wearing Nike
Id. (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1991)).
Id. (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 348-49).
231 Id. at 1120.
232 Id.; see Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If
there’s a wide range of expression (for example, there are gazillions of ways to make an aliensattack movie), then copyright protection is ‘broad’ and a work will infringe if it’s ‘substantially
similar’ to the copyrighted work.”).
233 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1120.
234 Id. at 1122-23.
235 Id. at 1123. In my opinion, the photographs are similar in their overall idea of Jordan in
a ballet-inspired pose. However, this general idea should not amount to substantial similarity.
Instead, Nike’s photographer stole Rentmeester’s creative and artistic expression of this balletinspired idea.
236 Id. at 1122.
237 Id. at 1121-22.
238 Id. at 1122.
229
230

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020

27

Touro Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 [2020], Art. 4

1154

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

shoes and the colors of his basketball team, the Chicago Bulls. 239
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the works were not
substantially similar as a matter of law. 240
In the dissenting opinion, Judge Owens agreed with the
majority that there was no copyright infringement, but he disagreed
with the court’s application of the law in coming to that conclusion.241
He reasoned that “questions of substantial similarity are inherently
factual, and should not have been made” on a motion to dismiss.242 In
this case, both photographs show “Jordan doing a grand-jeté pose
while holding a basketball,” and the photographs “are taken from a
similar angle, have a silhouette aspect of Jordan against a contrasting
solid background, and contain an outdoor setting with no indication of
basketball apart from an isolated hoop and backboard.” 243 For Judge
Owens, he was not certain “that no reasonable jury could find in favor
of Rentmeester.” 244 Unlike the majority, Judge Owens was hesitant to
grant Nike’s motion as a matter of law. 245 Consequently, Judge Owens
concluded, “that whether the Nike photo is substantially similar is not
an uncontested breakaway layup, and therefore dismissal of that
copyright infringement claim is premature.” 246
If this case was not decided as a matter of law, it is possible
that a jury would have found that the photographs were substantially
similar. In fact, William Patry warned against overstepping on the
jury’s critical job in evaluating whether works are substantially
similar. 247 He stated, “the critical point is that reasonable minds
looking at the two photos might disagree about whether there is
infringement. Judge Owens’ partial dissent by itself is evidence of
this.” 248 According to Patry, the Ninth Circuit ignored the subjectivity
of copyright infringement suits. 249 Specifically, the court erred in its
method “where, if at least two appellate judges wouldn’t find
infringement, the dispute can be decided at the pleading stage so long
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249

Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1121.
Id. at 1127 (Owens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Owens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1127-28 (Owens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1128 (Owens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Owens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1129 (Owens, J., dissenting).
3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:86.50 (Sept. ed. 2019).
Id.
Id.
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as the two works are attached to the complaint.” 250 Although it is
unknown whether a jury would have found the two photographs to be
substantially similar, the Ninth Circuit should have given a jury the
opportunity to evaluate the two works.
The subsequent section will illustrate the improper analysis of
the Ninth Circuit and how the Second Circuit, similar to the First and
Eleventh Circuits, would have decided this case. Then, it will examine
the implications of if the Supreme Court had reviewed this case or a
similar case. Lastly, it will discuss the potential negative implications
of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis on creativity in photography.
V.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF RENTMEESTER V. NIKE, INC. ON
CREATIVITY OF PHOTOGRAPHIC WORKS

A.

Circuit Split and the Ninth Circuit’s Major Errors

The Ninth Circuit’s decision improperly applied the test for
substantial similarity when analyzing the photographs, resulting in a
split with the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits on the protection for
For the Ninth Circuit,
photographs under copyright law. 251
photographic works are protected “in their selection and arrangement
of unprotected facts,” thereby comparing a photograph to a
phonebook. 252 In comparison, several other circuits have consistently
held that a photographer’s original photographic choices are protected
under copyright law. 253 The Ninth Circuit’s split from these circuits is
not necessarily undesirable if the court accurately analyzed the law and
protection for photographs. However, for several reasons, the Ninth
Circuit’s application of the test for substantial similarity was
inaccurate and improperly conducted.
First, the court ignored the Supreme Court’s decision in
Burrow-Giles, which recognized that “copyright law protects
intentionally staged photographic subject matter.” 254 In Burrow-Giles,
the Court held that copyright law protects a photographer’s
250

Id.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 24 (“In holding that the individual
elements of a photograph are categorically unprotectable in copyright law, even when the
photographer staged an original tableau, the Ninth Circuit split from the First, Second, and
Eleventh Circuits, and brought its law into tension with the Third and Tenth Circuits.”).
252 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 3.
253 Id. at 26.
254 Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 2.
251
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“intellectual invention.” 255
In that case, Sarony purposefully
positioned Oscar Wilde, selected his clothing, and arranged the
lighting to evoke a specific expression that he envisioned for the
photograph. 256 This recognition for the protection of originally staged
photographs prevents other photographers from replicating the
creative arrangement of the subject of the photograph. 257
An important caveat to the copyrightability of poses is that
specific poses or mere ideas that are “found in the common domain are
the inheritance of everyone” and are not protected under copyright
law. 258 However, it is the photographer’s creativity, originality, and
expressive choices in posing and creating the subject of the photograph
that will be protected. 259 Professor Terry S. Kogan of S.J. Quinney
College of Law stated, “[i]n instances in which the artist stages or
poses the scene that she ultimately paints or photographs, those actions
enhance the completed work’s originality because they evidence an
additional input of personality into the work.” 260
Thus, a
photographer’s choices in posing the subject of the photograph elevate
the degree of creativity of the photograph. 261
Since Burrow-Giles was decided in 1884, the courts have
consistently recognized that “copyright protection extends to the
staged subject matter of a photograph.” 262 For instance, in Harney, the
First Circuit explained that there is copyright protection when a
photographer “arranges or otherwise creates the content by” posing the
subject of the photograph. 263 Although the court ruled against Harney
because he did not create or pose the father and daughter, the First
Circuit’s recognition of the protection for intentionally arranged
255 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884). For a detailed
discussion of Burrow-Giles, see supra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
256 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 55.
257 See NIMMER, supra note 21, § 2A.08[E][3][a][i] (2019) (“[W]hen the author of the
photograph creates original subject matter (e.g., a sculpture, or distinctly posing individuals)
that is then incorporated into the photograph, copyright protection for the photograph actually
may—in principle—allow the photographer to prevent others from reproducing that subject
matter.”); see also Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 6
(“[T]his Court established that photographers who staged their subjects were authors of
original works protected from copyright infringement.”).
258 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992).
259 Id.
260 Terry S. Kogan, The Enigma of Photography, Depiction, and Copyright Originality, 25
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 869, 911 (2015).
261 Id. at 876.
262 Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 2.
263 Harney v. Sony Pictures Television, Inc., 704 F.3d 173, 180 (1st Cir. 2013).
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subjects in a photograph is consistent with Burrow-Giles. 264 Similarly,
the Second Circuit in Koons found that Rogers creatively arranged and
posed the couple and their eight puppies. 265 Although the idea of the
puppies with the couple is not protected, Rogers’ creativity and
original judgments in placing the puppies and the couple is protected
under copyright law. 266
Unlike the First and Second Circuits and the Supreme Court in
Burrow-Giles, the Ninth Circuit failed to appreciate “Rentmeester’s
staged arrangement as a protected tableau.” 267
For instance,
“Rentmeester created many of his photo’s most original elements by
directing and posing his subject, artificially manipulating the lighting
and landscape, and employing a variety of skillful compositional
techniques (bearing on the angle, lens, depth of field, and more).”268
Specifically, Rentmeester instructed Jordan on the exact balletinspired leaping pose that he wanted, and he positioned his camera at
a precise angle to capture Jordan’s leaping pose. 269 Rentmeester’s
staged photograph, similar to the staged photographs in Burrow-Giles
and Koons, should have been protected under copyright law.270
However, the Ninth Circuit disregarded Rentmeester’s original and
creative staging of Jordan and failed to recognize that Nike infringed
Rentmeester’s photograph. 271
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit “failed to extend adequate
copyright protection to the camera-related choices that Rentmeester
made prior to taking his picture.” 272 For Rentmeester, these choices
included “which camera, film, lenses, and filters to use; angle of shot;
See id. at 182. For an explanation of the First Circuit’s analysis of Harney’s photograph,
see supra notes 109-20 and accompanying text.
265 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1992).
266 Id. at 308.
267 Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 2. Tableau is
defined as “a representation of a picture, statue, scene, etc., by one or more persons suitably
costumed
and
posed.”
Tableau,
DICTIONARY.COM,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/tableau (last visited May 11, 2019).
268 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 39.
269 Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct.
1375 (2019).
270 See Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 11
(“Accordingly, Rentmeester’s tableau is protected by copyright and should be treated as the
photographer’s singular subject matter.”).
271 Id. at 8. “[N]early every single element that Burrow-Giles (properly) identified as
protectable would not be protected under the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.” Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 14, at 39.
272 Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 2.
264
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aperture setting (f-stop); shutter speed; focus; ISO setting; use of
special lighting and shading techniques; and timing of shot (e.g., time
of day, atmospheric conditions, and moment at which to depress the
shutter button).” 273 Specifically, he “used powerful strobe lights and a
fast shutter speed to capture a sharp image of Jordan contrasted against
the sky.” 274 Also, he shot the photo from an angle looking up at Jordan
and “at the peak of his jump so that the viewer looks up at Jordan’s
soaring figure silhouetted against a cloudless blue sky.” 275 While the
Ninth Circuit did concede that Jordan’s pose was “highly original,” it
failed to consider Rentmeester’s original choices prior to
photographing Jordan when it held that Nike only borrowed the idea
of Rentmeester’s photograph. 276 The court also likened these original
photographic choices to unprotectable factual elements. 277 As the
Ninth Circuit interpreted individual photographic elements as
unprotectable, the court only recognized copyright protection in the
selection and arrangement of these elements. 278 However, because the
court only found similarities in the general idea, 279 it explained that
“Rentmeester cannot claim an exclusive right to ideas or concepts at
that level of generality, even in combination.” 280 The court concluded
that Nike’s photographer made selections and arrangements that were
“unmistakably different from Rentmeester’s photo,” resulting in no
copyright infringement. 281 In contrast, the Second Circuit in Koons
recognized that there was originality and protection in the
photographer’s choices, such as the posing, lighting, angle, camera,
and film choice. 282
Further, the Ninth Circuit erred when it ignored the protection
for Rentmeester’s individual photographic elements. 283 For example,

273

Id.
Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1115-16.
275 Id. at 1115.
276 Id. at 1121.
277 Id. at 1120 (according to the Ninth Circuit, the individual elements of a photograph are
unprotectable facts that can be used by any photographer to create a new photograph).
278 Id. at 1122.
279 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
280 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d.at 1123.
281 Id. at 1122. For the Ninth Circuit’s list of the differences between the photographs, see
supra notes 236-39.
282 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992).
283 See Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 19 (“Camerarelated choices are individual artistic expressions, akin to a painter’s mixing his paint,
274
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in Leigh, the Eleventh Circuit held that there was copyright protection
in the individual elements in Leigh’s photograph, specifically “the
selection of lighting, shading, timing, angle, and film.” 284 Unlike the
Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit did not treat these elements “as
unprotectable facts arranged creatively.” 285 That court’s decision,
unlike the Ninth Circuit’s decision, is supported by copyright law in
its recognition that an author’s expressive originality and creativity are
protectable. 286 In this case, the Ninth Circuit improperly likened
photographic elements to unprotectable facts because it failed to
recognize that “Mr. Rentmeester did not ‘select’ Mr. Jordan’s pose, in
the same manner as would a compiler of phone numbers select what
numbers to include in a phone book. The artist here created Mr.
Jordan’s pose, and he created the tangible expression of that pose in
the photograph.” 287 In fact, Rentmeester did not arrange “a pile of
preexisting, unchanged facts,” but he created “highly-original,
carefully-staged elements.” 288 Thus, the Ninth Circuit improperly
overlooked the creative and expressive elements that are protected
under copyright law.
Next, while the Ninth Circuit correctly decided that
Rentmeester’s photograph was subject to broad copyright
protection, 289 it failed to apply broad protection to the photograph.
Instead, because the court examined the individual photographic
elements as unprotectable facts, the court treated the photograph “as
though it were entitled to only the thin protection afforded databases,
phonebooks, and other factual compilations.” 290 As a result, the Ninth
Circuit required that there be “near-virtual identity” between the
choosing a brush, or choosing a brushstroke technique. If a pirating photographer imitates
those choices in enough detail, he will infringe the original.”).
284 Leigh v. Warner Brothers, Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2000).
285 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 36.
286 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2019) (stating that there is protection “in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”).
287 Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 13-14. Here, the pose
should be protectable because Rentmeester originally and creatively posed Jordan.
288 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 39.
289 See Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 2 (“Because
Rentmeester both staged the tableau for his photograph and made highly original camerarelated choices in taking his picture, that image is entitled to the broadest copyright
protection.”). For a discussion of broad copyrights, see supra notes 232-33 and accompanying
text.
290 Id. at 3; see Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
(“explaining that factual compilations are subjection to thin copyright protection).
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photographs in order to find copyright infringement. 291 Professor
Terry S. Kogan explained when photographic works should be subject
to thin copyright protection. 292 He stated, “[i]f the camera-related
choices and actions that a photographer utilizes in snapping a picture
have been largely dictated by previous creative choices and actions of
others or by industry conventions, then the photographer’s resulting
image is entitled only to thin copyright protection against slavish
replication.” 293 Based on Professor Kogan’s analysis of thin copyright
protection, the Ninth Circuit misused a thin protection analysis for
Rentmeester’s photograph because Rentmeester originally and
expressively created the photograph of Jordan. 294 Instead, for the test
for substantial similarity, the court required “a near-slavish copy” of
Rentmeester’s photograph in order to find that Nike was liable for
copyright infringement. 295
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of Rentmeester’s
idea is problematic. 296 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the overall
idea of Rentmeester’s photograph was to show Jordan “holding a
basketball above his head in his left hand with his legs extended, in a
pose at least loosely based on the grand jeté.” 297 With this very
specific characterization of the idea that included expressive elements,
the court ignored Rentmeester’s highly original and creative choices
as protected expression. 298 The court further muddied the distinction
between general ideas and expression when it likened the untraditional
outdoor setting and camera angle showing “the subject silhouetted
against the sky” as mere ideas. 299 By eliminating these highly
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir.
2018) (No. 18-728).
292 Terry S. Kogan, How Photographs Infringe, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 353, 360
(2017).
293 Id. at 361.
294 See Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 21 (“Despite
the Ninth Circuit’s consistent praise of the originality of his photograph, its analogizing
Rentmeester’s photograph to a factual compilation effectively relegates the work to the
thinnest realm of copyright protection.”).
295 See id.
296 See Lee Burgunder, The Changing Landscape of Copyrights: Hope Shifts from
15,
2019),
Photographers
to
Users, IPWATCHDOG (Oct.
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/10/15/changing-landscape-copyrights-hope-shiftsphotographers-users/id=114535/.
297 Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct.
1375 (2019).
298 See Burgunder, supra note 296.
299 Id.; Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1123.
291
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expressive similarities from the evaluation of substantial similarity, the
court only considered “secondary details,” such as the position of
Jordan’s legs, as protected and expressive elements. 300 As a result, the
court bypassed the major expressive similarities between the
photographs, making it easy to find differences between these
“secondary details.” 301
Another concern is that the court did not provide any guidance
on how it distinguished the general idea from Rentmeester’s
expressive choices. 302 Instead, the court only stated the idea “as if it
had to be true.” 303 If the Ninth Circuit had defined the idea in a
different way, it is possible that his artistic choices would have been
considered expressive and protectable. 304 For example, Rentmeester’s
idea may have been to simply capture Jordan playing basketball, or he
may have wanted to show Jordan leaping with a ballet-esque pose
towards the basketball hoop. 305 Other possible characterizations of the
idea include capturing Jordan leap in the air while trying to dunk the
basketball, showing Jordan leap towards the hoop “with a dance
move,” or highlighting Jordan’s leap towards the hoop “with an
unusual posture.” 306 Any of these characterizations would have likely
given Rentmeester the protection and artistic credit for his original and
expressive choices. 307 However, the Ninth Circuit chose to blend
Rentmeester’s expressive choices as part of the general idea, making
it difficult for Rentmeester to be given the appropriate protection for
his work. 308
Next, the Ninth Circuit correctly acknowledged that if the Nike
photograph replicated and exactly copied Rentmeester’s “highly
original” pose, a jury might have found that Nike was liable for
copyright infringement. 309 The Ninth Circuit is also correct in stating
that Rentmeester cannot prevent other photographers from
300 Burgunder, supra note 296. Other details considered were “the skyline, the sun, lighting
and shadows, and Jordan’s position in the photo.” Id.
301 Burgunder, supra note 296; see Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note
1, at 17 (“The tangible expression of the idea by Mr. Rentmeester is exactly what was stolen.”).
302 Burgunder, supra note 296.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 See id.
309 Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct.
1375 (2019).
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photographing the idea of Jordan in a ballet-inspired pose. 310 The
crucial aspect of this case is that Rentmeester was not attempting to
gain copyright protection for his ballet-inspired pose; instead, he
argued for copyright protection in the original and unique choices that
he made when photographing Jordan. 311 However, the essential
problem is that the Ninth Circuit failed to consider that “the minor
differences between Rentmeester’s and Nike’s photographs do not
undermine the fact that Nike copied the critical features of
Rentmeester’s staged tableau.” 312
An evaluation of how the Ninth Circuit would have decided
Burrow-Giles will demonstrate the court’s flawed interpretation of the
protection for photographic works. In Burrow-Giles, the Supreme
Court held that Sarony’s photograph of Wilde was entitled to copyright
protection because he arranged an original and creative work. 313 In
several ways, Sarony’s and Rentmeester’s photographs were similar
because both photographers creatively and thoughtfully orchestrated
the pose, the subject of the photograph, the perspective, the
background, the lighting, and other elements. Unlike the Supreme
Court’s determination that Sarony was entitled to protection for these
original photographic choices, the Ninth Circuit dismissed similar
original artistic judgments in “Rentmeester’s meticulously staged
tableau” as unprotectable. 314 Thus, if the Ninth Circuit had decided the
Burrow-Giles case, it is likely that it would have denied Sarony
copyright protection for his original work.
The Second Circuit’s analysis of photographic works is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Burrow-Giles. If
this case had been decided in the Second Circuit, it is possible that
Rentmeester would have been granted protection for his work. In
particular, just as Rogers was granted copyright protection for his
original arrangement and pose of the puppies and the couple,
Rentmeester would be granted protection for his inventive positioning

310

Id.
Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 13. In reality,
not all ballet-inspired poses are as inventive and original as Rentmeester’s pose.
312 Id. at 18.
313 For a discussion of this case, see Part III.A. Similar to Rentmeester’s photograph of
Jordan, “Sarony was not claiming an exclusive right to photograph Oscar Wilde.” Brief of
Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 13.
314 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4, Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2018)
(No. 18-728).
311
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of Jordan. 315 Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit would most
likely hold that Rentmeester’s original artistic judgments are
protectable because he uniquely staged his photograph. 316
The mere fact that the Ninth Circuit split from the other circuits
is not the reason for disagreement with its decision. A major problem
with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Rentmeester is that it fails to
provide the necessary protection for photographs. Instead, the Second
Circuit’s protection for photographs aligns more closely with the
Supreme Court’s interpretation in Burrow-Giles. Based on the reasons
set forth in this section, the Ninth Circuit inappropriately and
inaccurately analyzed these photographs under copyright law.
Specifically, the court failed to appreciate that Rentmeester carefully,
meticulously, and thoughtfully chose each individual element of his
photograph in an artistic manner. In the next section, this Note will
describe how the Ninth Circuit’s decision will impact photographic
creativity.
B.

Creativity and Photography

Aside from the Ninth Circuit’s improper application of the law,
its decision also has negative implications on the future of creativity in
photography. Unlike other forms of art, such as music and paintings,
photography is a recent art form, resulting in photography often being
viewed as an “inferior art.” 317 Specifically, photography was
perceived as having an inferior status largely because of “its
mechanical nature and depiction of external reality.” 318 Because
photographs can be quickly taken due to advancements in technology,
there is a misconception that taking a photograph “requires little
effort.” 319 In reality, many photographers, like Rentmeester, create
their photographs from “a product of extensive skill, experience, and
creative talent.” 320
Despite these common misconceptions,

For a discussion of these cases, see Part III.B.2. and Part IV.
See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 314, at 9 (“The First and Second Circuits hold
that an original tableau staged by a photographer and expressed in a photograph is
protectable.”).
317 Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 10.
318 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 11.
319 Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 4.
320 Id.
315
316
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photographs have generally received the necessary recognition as a
protected work under copyright law. 321
However, the Ninth Circuit’s decision inevitably bolstered the
initial view that photographs are an inferior work of art. 322 By likening
the photographic elements in Rentmeester’s photograph to factual
elements, the Ninth Circuit stripped Rentmeester of his creative and
artistic judgments. 323 This decision wrongly implies “that the
individual elements in a photograph are divorced from the creativity of
the photographer.” 324 As the following hypothetical will examine,
each photographer’s artistic and creative choices in a photograph
should be protected.
In this hypothetical, consider a scenario in which Nike’s
photograph was simply inspired by Rentmeester’s photograph and
only captured the idea of Jordan in a ballet-inspired pose. 325 In this
hypothetical photograph, Jordan is not leaping in a ballet-inspired pose
towards the basketball hoop. Instead, Jordan is in a relevé 326 ballet
position with his hands extended above his head.
Unlike
Rentmeester’s photograph, Jordan is not dunking the basketball, but he
has the basketball grasped between his upraised hands. Also, the
photograph is shot at an angle looking down at Jordan’s face, revealing
his concentration and determination. The photographer instructed
Jordan that he wanted to highlight his facial expressions. Similar to
the Rentmeester photograph, the hypothetical photograph is taken
outdoors, but this photograph is taken on a busy New York City
sidewalk against a beautiful sunrise. Lastly, Jordan is wearing Nike
apparel in this photograph, not a traditional basketball uniform.
Unlike the actual Nike photograph, this Nike photograph is not
substantially similar to Rentmeester’s photograph because it only
copied the idea of Jordan’s playing basketball in a ballet pose. While
Id. at 11.
See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 314, at 11 (“This decision thus gives renewed
life to a centuries-old view of photography as an inferior art—a misperception that this Court
rightly rejected in Burrow-Giles, and that the Court is once again called upon to repudiate
here.”).
323 See Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 12 (“It equates a phone
book—a functional tool that merely arranges pre-existing and unchanged phone numbers—
with a work of art in which the artist has carefully created each foundational element.”).
324 Id.
325 For this hypothetical photograph, only a few photographic elements are considered,
including the pose, camera angle, and the background setting. The purpose of this hypothetical
is to distinguish between inspiration and infringement of another photographer’s work.
326 In this ballet pose, the ballet dancer will have his or her feet together in a raised position.
321
322
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there are similarities between the photographs, such as the outdoor
setting, the hypothetical photograph does not copy any specific
elements. Instead, the photographs are different in their camera angle,
pose, setting, and other elements. Although some elements are quite
similar, there are no indications of copying. For example, while
Rentmeester’s photograph is taken against a cloudless sky, this Nike
photograph is shot against a beautiful sunrise, revealing clear
differences in the background.
This hypothetical photograph is intended to show that
photographers can be inspired by another photographer when taking a
photograph. However, the resulting photograph must represent the
photographer’s own expression, creativity, and originality to prevent
copying and infringement. In Rentmeester, Nike’s photographer was
allowed to build on the idea of a ballet-inspired pose, but he improperly
stole Rentmeester’s creative and artistic expression. This decision
conflicts with the Framers’ intent to promote the creation of creative
works. 327 Further, this decision will strip photographers “of their
ability to protect the creative expression of their work from anything
other than wholesale lifting.” 328
The Ninth Circuit’s decision may stifle creativity because
photographers will be cautious about creating works that could be
easily copied. In their amici curiae brief, The American Society of
Media Photographers, Inc. and The National Press Photographers
Association argued:
One can imagine that if Mr. Rentmeester was faced
with the knowledge that he would not be able to protect
and profit from his creative work, he would not have
created the image in the first place. The world would
have been deprived of an iconic image that has
animated the minds and souls of millions of people
across the globe. . . . The public good, in a very literal
sense, would have been less robust, less fulfilled, and
weakened. It is inconsistent with copyright law and the
constitutional purpose of the Copyright Act that Nike
should reap such an enormous benefit from a creative
work, without permission, and the creator should be left

327
328

See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 5.
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with a right without a remedy. Creations such as Mr.
Rentmeester’s must continue to be protected. 329
The Ninth Circuit’s decision may halt photographers from
producing and creating works in anticipation of other photographers
stealing their creative and artistic judgments. If this case had adopted
the Second Circuit’s approach, photographers would be rewarded for
their originality and creativity rather than being punished and
demeaned. 330 As the next section will discuss, the Supreme Court
should have reviewed this case to protect each photographer’s creative
expression.
C.

The Supreme Court Should Have Reviewed This
Case

On March 25, 2019, the Supreme Court denied Rentmeester’s
petition for certiorari. 331 For several reasons, the Court should have
granted this petition in order to prevent the stifling of photographic
creativity and to resolve the circuit split.
First, the Supreme Court’s review of the Ninth Circuit’s
decision could have ensured the continuation of photographic
creativity and photography’s place as an art form. 332 In general, while
a photographer can draw inspiration from another photographer’s work
under copyright law, protection is “needed from wholesale duplication
of the expression of their inspiration.” 333 In this case, Nike was entitled
to draw inspiration from Rentmeester’s photograph, but it was
prohibited from taking Rentmeester’s original expression and creative
arrangements. However, the Ninth Circuit’s decision ultimately stands
for the proposition that Nike could do just that. 334 In addition, the
Ninth Circuit “treats photography as a second-class art and denigrates
Id. at 7.
See id. at 9 (“If the goals of the courts and legislatures that have recognized the
importance of copyright protection are to be upheld at all, these decisions that target and
demean both photographers and photography as an art and [sic] must be reversed.”).
331 Rentmeester
v. Nike Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/rentmeester-v-nike-inc/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
332 See Part V.B. for a discussion of the potential stifling of creativity.
333 Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 4.
334 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 40 (“The Rentmeester photo is an
original work of art that expresses Michael Jordan’s elegance and athletic ability. . . [the]
expressive elements were meticulously created by Rentmeester, and then meticulously pirated
by Nike.”).
329
330
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photographers’ artistic judgments.” 335 As a result, the Ninth Circuit’s
decision may reinforce the idea that photographs are mere factual
works, stripping away the protections that should rightfully be given
to photographers for their expressive photographic choices.
Second, a review of this case would have settled the circuit split
on this issue, allowing photographers to be certain of the protections
that they will be granted for their photographs. In Rentmeester’s
petition for certiorari, he persuasively argued that this case serves as
“an excellent vehicle” to evaluate the differing interpretations of
copyright law among the circuits. 336 In particular, while the Supreme
Court’s review of this case could have corrected the Ninth Circuit’s
flawed analysis, “the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous rule of law will stand
as an obstacle to uniform application of the Copyright Act” because
the decision “will sow confusion, reward piracy, and stifle
creativity.” 337 On the other hand, even if the Supreme Court had
reviewed this case and agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision, a
review of this case would have at least provided photographers with
clear guidance on how the courts will examine future cases with similar
issues. 338 Ideally, a review of this case would have been essential to
provide clarity among the circuits on copyright protection for
photographs.
In the future, the Supreme Court should correct the Ninth
Circuit’s flawed application of copyright law to prevent this
uncertainty in the law. However, absent a Supreme Court decision, the
courts interpreting the Ninth Circuit’s decision should reconsider its
approach in future photography infringement cases. The next section
will provide a proposed approach for the Ninth Circuit, along with any
other circuits that may share or adopt its view, in future cases.
D.

Proposed Approach for Photography Cases in the
Ninth Circuit

The decision in Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc. demonstrates that the
Ninth Circuit should reevaluate its approach to the scope of copyright
Id. at 3.
Id. at 38.
337 Id.
338 Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 4 (“Leaving this area of
law jumbled and confused with conflicting opinions would chill the creation of new works
and give the green light to infringers the world over. These creators need clarity.”).
335
336
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protection for photographs. By comparing individual photographic
elements to factual works, the Ninth Circuit stripped photographs of
their artistic and creative nature as a protected art form. The court
should consider its decision with the case law from the Supreme Court
and the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits to reevaluate the
protection that it should have given to Rentmeester’s photograph.
In future photography cases, the Ninth Circuit should clearly
distinguish between individual unprotectable facts in a factual work
and individual protectable photographic elements. Specifically, if the
Ninth Circuit were to receive a photography case requiring the jury to
review the substantial similarity between two photographs, the court
should clearly distinguish between unprotectable facts and protectable
photographic elements. This instruction to the jury would require the
Ninth Circuit to accept that photographers can make creative and
original arrangements and expressive choices that are protectable. The
jury would also need to be instructed that mere ideas and concepts are
not protectable, but it is the author’s expression of that idea that is
protected. For example, if a court in the Ninth Circuit were to instruct
a jury based on this case, it would tell the jury that the idea of shooting
a basketball in a ballet-inspired pose is not protectable. However, the
court would tell the jury that Rentmeester’s original and creative
expression of that idea, namely the pose, lighting, angle, and camera
speed, are protected. This case should have had a different result if the
jury heard this case with these instructions.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit should reexamine its application
of copyright law compared to the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits.
These circuits closely align with the Supreme Court’s precedent in
Burrow-Giles, recognizing that there is copyright protection for a
photographer’s original and creative choices. Likewise, the Eleventh
Circuit, for example, demonstrated the importance of deferring to the
jury in deciding whether two works are substantially similar. Given
the similarities between Nike’s photograph and Rentmeester’s
photograph, 339 along with Rentmeester’s highly original and inventive
creation, the jury should have been given the opportunity to hear this
case. Overall, the Ninth Circuit should consider aligning with the First,
Second, and Eleventh Circuits because the approach of these circuits
provides a fairer and more consistent application of copyright law.

339

For a discussion of the similarities between the photographs, see supra notes 197, 243.
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CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc. has
serious implications for the future of photographic creativity and the
protections given to photographs under copyright law. In deciding that
the photographs were not similar as a matter of law, the court denied
Rentmeester the opportunity of presenting the factual issues in his case
to a jury. Further, in choosing not to review Rentmeester’s case, the
Supreme Court left the protection for photographs unsettled. This will
most likely result in more photographers copying other photographers’
creative expression without being held liable for infringement. The
Ninth Circuit should correct this misapplication of the law and align
with the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits by giving protection to
photographers for their creative and expressive photographic choices.
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APPENDIX

Note: This photographic comparison of Rentmeester’s
photograph and Nike’s photograph is found in the Ninth
Circuit’s decision.
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